ALT-38 · Analysis · 23 Oct 2026

NotPetya: the wiper that came through a tax update

A destructive worm disguised as ransomware spread from a Ukrainian accounting program's update server to global companies in hours. The mechanism, the cost, and the attribution.

Timeline
  1. 27 Jun 2017The worm spreads within hours from Ukrainian networks to multinationals.
  2. Aug 2017Maersk estimates its cost at $200–300 million.
  3. 15 Feb 2018The White House calls it the most destructive and costly cyber-attack in history and attributes it to Russia's military.
Maersk's own estimate of its cost
$200–300MMaersk Q2 2017 interim report, via Computer Weekly

How it spread

Inside a network it combined two methods: EternalBlue against unpatched Windows machines, and credentials pulled from memory to log into patched ones. The second meant patching alone was not enough; one administrator's password could open everything.

Our reading

Analysis — Altumptic's interpretation of the sources below.

  • Update channels are the most trusted path into a network — and therefore a target.
  • Credential reuse turns one compromised machine into all of them.
  • Organisations that only did business in a country still became collateral damage.

What to do

  1. Use unique local administrator passwords (LAPS or equivalent) on every machine.
  2. Segment networks so that one site's compromise cannot reach every other site.
  3. Keep offline backups — including of domain controllers — and practise rebuilding.

Sources

  1. White House — Statement from the Press Secretary (15 Feb 2018)
  2. CISA — Petya ransomware alert (TA17-181A)
  3. Computer Weekly — NotPetya attack cost up to $300m, says Maersk (Aug 2017)

Altumptic has no involvement in these incidents and no non-public information about them. Figures are as reported by the sources above on the dates given.

Cite this entry

Altumptic Lab (2026). ALT-38 — NotPetya: the wiper that came through a tax update. 23 Oct 2026. altumptic.com/research/notpetya-2017